Notice. FG Capital Advisors is a trade and capital advisory firm focused on commodities, structured trade finance, and private credit. The firm provides financial modelling, due diligence support, structuring, and sponsor side advice around mining and metals transactions, including exposure to copper, cobalt, and related battery metals. FG Capital Advisors is not a bank, lender, broker dealer, or retail investment adviser and does not issue securities or investment products. Any facility or investment is provided by regulated counterparties under their own licences and documentation. This page comments on country and sector risk at a general level and does not constitute investment advice or a recommendation to pursue any transaction in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) or elsewhere.
DRC Country Risk & Battery Metals: Mining Reality Versus Perception
The Democratic Republic of the Congo is treated in many investment committees as a binary “no go” jurisdiction. At the same time, it sits at the centre of global copper and cobalt supply, and hosts a list of tier one industrial assets run by major listed companies.
For investors who want battery metals exposure but exclude Congo entirely, there is a basic disconnect between geology and portfolio construction. The risk is real, but the way it is discussed in many Western capital pools is often exaggerated, incomplete, or outdated.
Scale Of The Prize: Copper & Cobalt Dominance
Any discussion of DRC country risk that ignores the scale of copper and cobalt is missing the point. The country has moved from a marginal position to a central supplier over the past decade.
- The DRC is the world’s second largest copper producer, with annual output now in the high two million tonne range. It has overtaken Peru on production and sits just behind Chile on recent data.
- On cobalt, the position is more extreme. Recent estimates put the DRC at roughly 70–75% of global mined cobalt output, with annual production around 170,000 tonnes and the largest known cobalt reserves worldwide.
- A significant share of newly booked copper reserves in recent years has been in the DRC, underscoring how much future supply growth is anchored there rather than in legacy camps alone.
Copper growth has been a material macro driver, contributing to double digit GDP prints in some recent years as new phases of major mines came online. For investors, that is not a side story; it is the core supply base for core energy transition metals.
Who Is Already Operating There
The claim that DRC risk is “uninvestable” sits awkwardly next to the reality of who has committed capital and keeps expanding.
- Kamoa–Kakula Copper Complex (Ivanhoe, Zijin, state). Ivanhoe Mines and Zijin Mining operate one of the largest high grade copper complexes in the world. Kamoa–Kakula has ramped to annual production in the high hundreds of thousands of tonnes of copper in concentrate, with further phases designed to push output higher.
- Tenke Fungurume and Kisanfu (CMOC Group). CMOC holds controlling stakes in the Tenke Fungurume and Kisanfu projects, widely regarded as world class copper–cobalt assets. TFM alone ranks among the largest copper mines globally and one of the largest cobalt mines.
- Glencore’s Kamoto and associated operations. Glencore, through Kamoto Copper Company and related ventures with state miner Gécamines, remains a major industrial producer of copper and cobalt in the Copperbelt.
- Kibali gold mine (Barrick, AngloGold, Sokimo). Kibali is a large scale gold complex in north eastern DRC, operated by Barrick and AngloGold Ashanti with state company Sokimo. It delivers several hundred thousand ounces per year and is one of Africa’s flagship gold assets.
These groups are not casual speculators. They are tier one or upper tier two producers with public markets scrutiny, independent reserves audits, and ESG reporting obligations. They have repeatedly chosen to allocate billions in capex to DRC assets, absorb political noise, and still pursue expansions.
Country Risk Versus Asset Level Reality
There are genuine issues: conflict in parts of the east, governance challenges, infrastructure gaps, and occasionally abrupt regulatory moves, including changes to the mining code or export policies. None of that is trivial.
At the same time, investors often conflate macro headlines with the actual risk profile of a secured industrial mining project that sits in a defined province, operates under English law financing documents, and is run by a large sponsor with multiple lines into Kinshasa.
- Policy risk is not unique to the DRC. Several African and non African jurisdictions have revised mining codes, raised royalties, or clashed with miners. The DRC’s 2018 mining code revisions, which increased royalties on “strategic substances” and tightened state participation, created friction but did not trigger a wholesale exit by majors.
- Export and quota moves are blunt, but usually temporary. Cobalt export bans and quota systems have periodically hit short term cash flows and pricing, but they have not led to unwinding of the core industrial asset base in the Copperbelt.
- Security risk is uneven, not universal. Eastern border areas carry a different security profile from Lualaba and Haut Katanga, where most copper–cobalt operations sit and where mining is heavily industrialised and more tightly controlled.
- ESG risk is segment specific. Artisanal cobalt supply has well publicised issues around labour and safety. Industrial mines that supply most of the volume operate under different regimes, with some assets participating in third party assurance schemes and stepped up traceability frameworks.
For lenders and investors, the relevant question is not “Is the DRC risky?” but “What is the risk profile of this specific asset, structure, sponsor, and security package in this province, under this law, over this time horizon?”
Policy Noise, Contracts, And English Law
One reason institutional capital tolerates DRC volatility is the ability to structure at the level of contracts, security, and governing law.
- English law and international financing standards. Major copper and cobalt projects in the DRC are typically financed under English law or New York law documents, with security packages that include share pledges, assignments of offtake, and charges over project accounts and movable assets. That gives lenders tested paths in default scenarios, even in a challenging local environment.
- Stability via long term offtake and JV structures. Joint venture agreements between international sponsors and Gécamines or other state entities, combined with long term offtakes to global metal traders and OEM linked buyers, create strong vested interests in keeping operations stable, even when there are disputes over tax or policy.
- Disputes tend to end in renegotiation, not expropriation. Tax, royalty, and compliance disputes make headlines, but the pattern in many cases has been hard negotiation followed by revised terms or settlements, not permanent loss of assets by the operator.
None of this eliminates risk. It does mean that for properly structured projects, risk sits in a range that specialist credit committees and equity investors are prepared to price, rather than in an off the charts category.
Battery Metals Investors: A Reality Check
Many investors say they want “battery metals exposure” but will not touch DRC risk. That position may feel comfortable in an IC room, yet it is increasingly detached from how the supply chain actually works.
- Cobalt without Congo is not a serious strategy. With roughly three quarters of global mined cobalt coming from the DRC, and a large share of reserves located there, any fund claiming significant cobalt exposure while excluding Congo is either relying heavily on financial derivatives or sitting in marginal volume.
- Copper growth is concentrated in the Copperbelt. DRC copper output has grown aggressively over the past decade, and the country now accounts for a double digit share of global supply with a disproportionate share of new reserves. Investors looking for growth projects in the next copper cycle cannot realistically ignore the Congo–Zambia system.
- Indirect exposure already exists. Many global portfolios already hold equity, credit, or offtake exposure to groups whose flagship growth assets or cash flows are DRC anchored. The idea that one is “avoiding Congo” while holding those names is more about optics than risk.
- ESG exclusion can clash with transition goals. Excluding Congo outright on headline ESG concerns without distinguishing between artisanal and industrial supply can push capital towards less transparent sources or constrain investment into precisely the projects that are trying to raise standards.
- Risk can be structured, not wished away. Concentrating exposure in single country alternatives does not eliminate geopolitical or policy risk; it just shifts it to jurisdictions where investors feel more familiar. The supply chain concentration problem remains.
A more honest framing is that DRC exposure requires harder work on structuring, monitoring, and engagement, not that it is inherently off limits while other emerging producers are automatically safe.
The DRC is not a low risk jurisdiction. Governance noise, policy shifts, and infrastructure constraints are part of the picture and need to be priced. Yet the claim that it is categorically unbankable sits at odds with the depth of copper and cobalt production, the scale of industrial operations, and the behaviour of serious operators.
For investors and lenders who want meaningful battery metals exposure, the question is not whether to avoid Congo entirely, but how to differentiate between asset types, structures, and sponsors in a country that will remain central to the energy transition supply chain.
Discuss DRC & Battery Metals ExposureDisclosure. FG Capital Advisors provides financial modelling, analytical, and advisory services. The firm does not originate, offer, or sell securities, loans, deposits, guarantees, or insurance products and does not accept client money. References to specific mines, companies, or jurisdictions are illustrative and do not constitute endorsements or investment recommendations. Country risk can change rapidly. Any decision to invest in or provide credit to projects in the DRC or elsewhere should be based on detailed due diligence, independent legal and tax advice, and the internal policies of the relevant institution. Any engagement with FG Capital Advisors is subject to internal approval, conflict checks, KYC and AML checks and sanctions screening where required, and the terms of a formal engagement letter.
