Rwanda Is Not Looting DRC’s Mineral Wealth

There’s a popular narrative that Rwanda is “looting” the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)’s mineral wealth, especially high-value minerals like copper and cobalt. But what do the facts and figures show? Let’s set the record straight with hard data on DRC’s mineral exports and where they actually go, and then explore how regional cooperation is shaping a better path forward.

DRC’s Copper and Cobalt Dominate Its Exports

To understand the situation, start with DRC’s export breakdown: Copper and cobalt are by far the most important exports for the DRC, dwarfing all other minerals in both volume and value. Consider these recent figures:

• Copper – In 2022, DRC’s copper exports were around 2.39 million tonnes, worth roughly $16.3 billion (refined copper alone). Copper (in various forms) accounts for well over half of DRC’s export revenue.
• Cobalt – DRC is the world’s top cobalt producer, exporting 86–115 thousand tonnes of cobalt in 2020–2022. In 2022, cobalt exports were valued about $6 billion. Cobalt is mined as a by-product of copper and makes up a huge share of DRC’s export earnings.
• Other Minerals – By comparison, other mined products (gold, diamonds, tin, coltan, etc.) are small fractions of export value. For example, tin ore exports were about $0.46 billion, and official gold exports a mere $21 million in 2020 (a sign of how much gold leaves the country unofficially). Even DRC’s crude oil exports (~$0.9 billion) pale next to copper and cobalt.

The takeaway: Copper and cobalt are the backbone of DRC’s export economy, contributing the vast majority of mineral export revenue. Any claim about “looting DRC’s minerals” must square with that reality.

Where Does DRC’s Mineral Revenue Go? (Follow the Trade)

If Rwanda were truly profiting massively from DRC’s minerals, we would expect to see Rwanda as a major destination for copper or cobalt exports. Trade data tells a very different story. The major buyers of DRC’s copper and cobalt are not its small neighbors, but rather global markets:

• China is the dominant buyer: Nearly half of DRC’s exports by value go to China. China alone purchased about 41% of DRC’s total exports – this includes the lion’s share of copper and cobalt.
• Other export partners: The next-biggest importers of DRC minerals are countries like Tanzania, Zambia, South Africa, Singapore, the UAE, Switzerland, etc. Tanzania and Zambia appear largely because DRC’s copper and cobalt often travel overland to seaports or smelters there. Countries in Europe and Asia buy the refined metals. Notably, Rwanda does not even figure in the list of significant export destinations for DRC’s minerals – in other words, official records show little to no copper/cobalt going to Rwanda.
• Who owns the mines? On the production side, DRC’s big copper and cobalt mines are operated by large industrial companies (often through joint ventures with DRC’s state mining firms). Many are owned or financed by foreign (mostly Chinese) companies, not Rwandan entities. In fact, about 80% of DRC’s industrial cobalt mines are in the hands of Chinese firms, and these companies export cobalt through international supply chains to Asia, Europe, and the US. The copper-cobalt belt itself is in DRC’s far southeast (Lualaba and Haut-Katanga provinces) – a region geographically and politically far removed from Rwanda and under government and corporate control. It is much more plausible that profits from DRC’s copper/cobalt are accruing to multinational mining corporations and the DRC state (and, admittedly, sometimes lost to corruption) than to a small neighboring country.

In short, the data doesn’t support the idea that Rwanda is siphoning off DRC’s copper and cobalt wealth. Most of DRC’s mineral revenue flows to (or through) big economies like China and global companies, not to Rwanda. Accusations that “Rwanda is profiting off DRC’s key mining sector” are misleading – they distract from the real distribution of the DRC’s resource wealth, which largely bypasses both Rwanda and the ordinary citizens of DRC itself.

The Real Mineral Flows Through Rwanda: Gold and 3Ts

That said, Rwanda does play a role in the regional mineral trade – just not in copper and cobalt. Smaller-scale and high-value minerals from eastern DRC (often mined artisanally in conflict-affected areas) do find their way into or through Rwanda. These include gold and the so-called “3T” minerals – tin (cassiterite), tungsten (wolframite), and tantalum ore (coltan):

• Artisanal Gold: The DRC is estimated to produce 15–22 tons of gold per year from artisanal miners, yet almost none of this is officially recorded. Instead, roughly 98% of DRC’s gold is smuggled out through neighboring countries. Rwanda has become a major transit hub for illicit Congolese gold. One investigative report found that while Rwanda officially declared only about 2,000 kg of gold exports, around 13,000 kg of gold (13 tonnes, worth hundreds of millions of USD) actually entered the UAE from Rwanda, presumably originating in DRC. Uganda and Burundi have similarly been points of exit for DRC’s gold. This is a serious problem – it deprives DRC of revenue – but it’s about gold smuggling networks, not the copper/cobalt industry.
• Coltan and Tin (3T minerals): Eastern DRC is rich in coltan (a source of tantalum) and cassiterite (tin ore), which are critical for electronics. Due to conflict and weak controls, significant quantities are unofficially exported via Rwanda. A UN expert report in late 2022 indicated that about 120 tonnes of coltan were being smuggled into Rwanda every month. This aligns with spikes in Rwanda’s reported exports of tantalum, tin, and tungsten, which likely include Congolese-origin minerals mixed in. While 120 tonnes/month is substantial, even a year’s worth of smuggled coltan (~1,440 tonnes) is only a tiny fraction of the mass of DRC’s annual copper exports (over 2.3 million tonnes) – and its value is also much smaller than the multi-billion-dollar copper/cobalt trade.

Why do these minerals transit through Rwanda? Proximity and profit. Rebel groups and smugglers in eastern DRC take advantage of porous borders to sell gold and 3T minerals into countries with better trading infrastructure or laxer controls. Rwanda (and Uganda) have well-organized export markets for these resources – including refineries and smelters – and international buyers find it easier to source “Rwandan” gold or tantalum than conflict-marked Congolese product.

This has led to distorted export stats (Rwanda sometimes exporting more of a mineral than it produces domestically) and the false perception that Rwanda is “stealing” DRC’s riches. In reality, Rwanda’s role is often that of a transit and processing hub – the end-buyers of these illicit mineral flows are usually in Dubai, Europe, or Asia, and the loss is really DRC’s own, in tax revenues and development.

Bottom line: Rwanda’s involvement in DRC’s mineral sector is largely confined to these informal, small-scale minerals. It’s a serious governance challenge to stop smuggling, but it is not the same as Rwanda reaping the benefits of DRC’s copper and cobalt mines. The scale and nature of the mineral flows are completely different. So, equating DRC’s overall mineral wealth with “profits to Rwanda” is inaccurate.

From Myths to Collaboration: Building Value in the Region

Rather than trading accusations, the focus is now shifting to regional collaboration to ensure that DRC’s minerals benefit its people and the region as a whole. With the DRC joining the East African Community (EAC) in 2022, there’s new momentum to integrate supply chains and add value locally instead of just exporting raw materials.

Here’s what this emerging cooperation looks like:

• Joint industrial projects: DRC and its neighbors are actively seeking ways to process and manufacture with these minerals within Africa. A landmark step came in April 2022, when DRC and Zambia signed an agreement to develop an electric-vehicle battery supply chain jointly. This deal aims to combine DRC’s cobalt and copper with Zambia’s copper (and industrial base) to manufacture battery components and even assemble EV batteries in the region, rather than simply shipping ore and concentrates overseas. Leaders from both countries hailed it as the start of a new era – Africa being more than a source of raw materials and instead moving up the value chain. This project is backed by international partners and could be a game-changer if implemented fully.



• Infrastructure and trade facilitation: Members of the EAC are improving cross-border infrastructure to make legal trade easier and more profitable than smuggling. For example, Uganda and DRC have launched joint road-building projects into eastern DRC, to connect Congolese production areas with East African transport routes. The EAC is also implementing one-stop border posts and harmonized regulations to speed up flows of goods. Better roads and trade centers mean Congolese minerals can reach formal markets (like Tanzanian ports) more directly, with transit countries collecting fair transit fees instead of illicit actors taking a cut.

• Local refining and value addition: Rwanda, Uganda, and Tanzania have been investing in refineries and smelters that can legally process regional minerals. Rwanda, for instance, has established a modern tin refinery (smelter) and a gold refinery in recent years, aiming to become a regional hub for ethical mineral processing. The idea is to certify and add value to minerals from the Great Lakes region so that they can be exported transparently at higher prices. Likewise, new policies in DRC are encouraging more on-site refining of copper and cobalt (DRC has begun producing battery-grade cobalt hydroxide and even some cathode precursors). All these efforts are about keeping more value in-country and in-region.

• EAC coordination: At the policy level, the EAC has identified extractive industries and mineral value addition as a priority area for regional development. By harmonizing regulations and pooling resources, East African countries (now including the DRC) are looking to attract investment in things like mineral processing plants, tech incubators for battery technology, and skill development for mining communities. This coordination is already underway – not just aspirational. We see it in regular EAC ministerial meetings on mining, and in the way global investors are being courted for regional projects instead of country-by-country deals.

The claim that “Rwanda is looting DRC’s minerals” does not hold up under scrutiny. DRC’s copper and cobalt wealth is overwhelmingly exported to global markets, with minimal direct involvement by Rwanda. Where Rwanda does figure – in illicit gold or coltan trade – it reflects deeper structural problems (conflict, weak governance, and the need for formalization) rather than a deliberate national project of plundering.

Moving forward, the most productive path is not finger-pointing but partnership. DRC’s mineral wealth, if responsibly managed, can fuel development across Central and East Africa. Regional initiatives in the EAC are already laying the groundwork for a more equitable supply chain – one where a battery made in Kigali or Lusaka might use cobalt from Katanga, to the benefit of all. By strengthening legal trade, improving transparency, and investing together in value-added industries, the countries of the region can ensure that Congo’s resources are a source of shared prosperity, not division.

In a globally connected minerals economy, cooperation is key. The data dispels the myth of Rwanda’s “looting” – and the real story is how regional collaboration is beginning to transform a narrative of suspicion into one of opportunity. It’s a welcome trend, and one that deserves more attention.